Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In our paper we demonstrate that, if a …rm employs at least two workers, it may further bene…t from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract and relative performance evaluation. Such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions. In addition, if the employer is wealth-constrained, complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable e¤ort levels. All our results hold even though workers' outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that, in view of Holmstrom's informativeness principle, individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus-pool contracts.
Introduction
In a moral-hazard problem, incentives can be created by using either carrots or sticks. In a world where workers are protected by limited liability, only carrots may be available. We show that the employer often can reduce rents paid to the workers by using one big carrot in the form of a bonus pool, instead of several small carrots that serve as individual bonus payments. Our results hold even when workers perform completely independent tasks. On the surface, this seems to contradict Holmstrom's informativeness principle 1 that bonus pools are inferior to individual bonuses because relative performance information is noisier. When the …rm faces constraints on the size of the overall pool of funds available for bonuses, however, the advantage of using one large carrot frequently outweighs the informational advantage of using several small carrots.
Individual bonus contracts are not only frequently observed in practice (e.g., Joseph and Kalwani 1998) , but are also often optimal in a second-best setting (e.g., Demougin and Fluet 1998 , Oyer 2000 , Herweg et al. 2010 .
Bonus contracts specify a certain threshold or quota together with a wage premium that is paid to a worker if his output exceeds the quota. If workers are risk neutral and the monotone likelihood ratio property holds, it is optimal for the employer to create high powered incentives by combining a very large quota with a very large wage premium.
In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a …rm that employs at least two workers can bene…t from pooling incentives. Under a bonus pool, the …rm speci…es a …xed amount of money to be distributed among the workers according to relative performance. In addition to the bonus payments, the bonus-pool contract speci…es a minimum distance or gap by which one worker must outperform his co-workers to get a high bonus.
2 This gap works similarly to the quota of an individual bonus contract because it 1 See Holmstrom (1979 Holmstrom ( , 1982 . 2 Alternatively, we can speak of a tournament scheme that is complemented by a gap;
see Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), pp. 30-32. in ‡uences both incentives and the probability with which bonus payments are made to the workers.
Since the workers'tasks are neither technically nor stochastically related, at …rst sight it does not make sense to pool workers'incentives: as relative performance is less informative about individual e¤ort choice than absolute performance, individual incentives should always work better than collective ones according to Holmstrom's informativeness principle. In other words, compared to individual bonuses, a certain e¤ort level can only be implemented via a bonus pool with relative performance evaluation if the bonus pool speci…es a su¢ ciently larger wage premium. The extra money is needed to replace missing incentives stemming from the fact that the impact of individual e¤ort on the performance measure is less strong. Hence, bonus pools should be too expensive and leave too much rents to the workers.
We o¤er two reasons why a bonus-pool contract can nevertheless beat individual bonus contracts: (1) often, the employer prefers the highest possible threshold (together with large bonus payments) under both types of contract. Thus, if the thresholds are bounded above (e.g., due to a collective agreement between an industry wide union and an employer association), the employer will choose the same threshold for either contract. However, the e¤ective threshold under a bonus pool with relative performance evaluation is considerably larger than the threshold under individual bonuses since under a bonus pool each worker has to beat the threshold and his opponents. This di¤erence leads to a lower probability of paying a large bonus and, hence, to reduced worker rents. (2) Under a bonus pool, several workers compete for only one large bonus payment, whereas under individual bonuses each worker has to be incentivized by a separate bonus. If the employer is …nancially constrained, one big bonus pool may work better than several individual bonuses, which have to be rather small due to the employer's limited wealth. In addition to saving rents, pooling bonuses may increase the set of implementable e¤orts.
In one of our results we demonstrate superiority of bonus pools under the assumption that the random variables that model workers'luck have an increasing hazard rate. Such an assumption is a standard one in the adverseselection literature. 3 In that work, the monotone-hazard-rate property does not refer to luck but to players'random types. However, all our results will completely remain the same if we reinterpret the random luck variables as the individual abilities of workers, characterizing their types and being unknown to each player ex ante. This reinterpretation only translates the standard moral-hazard setting into a moral-hazard model with symmetric ability uncertainty (see, e.g., Holmstrom 1999) . Furthermore, the hazard rate plays in our model a role that is similar to its role in the adverse-selection models:
it represents the trade-o¤ between inducing incentives and the magnitude of expected payment (see Poblete and Spulber 2012) . To sum up, accepting the monotone-hazard-rate property for the whole class of contract-theoretic models -including moral hazard -would imply that a bonus-pool contract outperforms individual bonus contracts under the assumption of limited liability.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 considers a speci…c example to illustrate our main …nding on the superiority of bonus pools over individual bonuses. In Section 5, we derive the optimal bonuspool contract. Section 6 compares optimal individual bonus contracts with the optimal bonus-pool contract. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our main …ndings.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the previous literature on individual bonuses and bonus pools. Demougin and Fluet (1998 ), Wolfstetter (1999 ), pp. 288-294, and Oyer (2000 investigate the optimal contract in a second-best setting.
3 See, e.g., the textbooks by Tirole (1988 ), p. 156, Wolfstetter (1999 ), p. 216, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005 ), p. 87, and Hermalin (2005 , p. 102.
They show that the optimal contract under risk neutral workers with limited liability is an individual bonus contract that attaches a …xed payment to a certain quota. Demougin and Fluet consider a setting with discrete outcomes and assume that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds. As a consequence, the bonus contract where the agent receives a positive payment only under the most favorable outcome is optimal. Similar to Oyer (2000) , we assume outcomes to be continuous. In our setting, a most favorable outcome need not exist and if it does, a contract that pays a positive bonus only under this outcome would be useless because the probability of the most favorable outcome is zero. To make the problem meaningful we either assume that the quota is bounded or, following Innes (1990) , that the principal is wealthconstrained. While the …rst assumption prevents tying a bonus to extremely high outcomes, the second one limits the magnitude of the bonus payments.
Bonus-pool contracts have been discussed in the literature on the traditional personnel policy of Japanese …rms and in the managerial-accounting literature. MacLeod (1989, 1992) show that bonus-pool contracts solve the problem of subjective performance evaluation of Japanese …rms. Baiman and Rajan (1995) also emphasize that bonus-pool contracts enable …rms to make use of subjective performance evaluation. Rajan and Reichelstein (2006) and Budde (2007) analyze the optimal design of bonuspool contracts under subjective (and additional objective) performance measures. Contrary to these papers, we assume that performance measures are objective and continuous and that they convey cardinal information. Moreover, we solve for the optimal e¤ort level and show that the optimal individual bonus contract and the optimal bonus-pool contract indeed lead to di¤erent e¤orts. All the previous papers on bonus pools do not directly contrast individual bonus contracts with a bonus-pool contract.
Beside theoretical contributions, the managerial-accounting literature also o¤ers empirical work on bonus pools (e.g., Healy 1985; Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999) . These studies mainly focus on how managers select accounting procedures to in ‡uence the magnitude of the bonus pools. Murphy and Oyer (2001) York City o¤ered its teachers a bonus pool of $57 million as incentive pay in addition to standard wages (Martinez 2011; Goodman and Turner 2013) .
All the examples mentioned in this paragraph show that the respective employers were able to use individual bonus contracts but they preferred bonus pools. The studies do not explain this preference. The advantage of bonus pools highlighted in our paper may be one reason, but there also exist further bene…ts of bonus pools which may be decisive as well (e.g., the commitment to an upper bound on overall labor costs).
Since the bonus-pool contract uses relative performance, our paper is also related to the literature on tournaments (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and Stokey 1983; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983) . In particular, there are strong parallels to tournaments with a gap (Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983, pp. 30-32; Eden 2007; Imhof and Kräkel 2011) , because the bonus-pool contract also uses a gap or minimum distance to …ne-tune incentives and the workers' probability of obtaining the high payment. The gap is somewhat related to handicaps, which are already addressed by the seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen (1981) , but there is an essential di¤erence. Handicaps are imposed on the ex ante stronger players to balance competition and, hence, to improve incentives. A gap, however, has to be beaten by each contestant. Moreover, the gap decreases incentives under an increasing hazard rate, but is nevertheless preferred by the employer to reduce worker rents.
Our paper is not the …rst one showing that an employer may prefer an incentive scheme that appears suboptimal according to Holmstrom's informativeness principle. Itoh (2004) , Goel and Thakor (2006) , Englmaier and Wambach (2010) and Bartling (2011) analyze incentive schemes in a situation where workers have other regarding preferences. Since inequity averse workers have to be compensated for their inequity costs under a binding participation constraint, it can be bene…cial for the employer to base incentives on a less informative performance measure if the resulting incentive scheme leads to lower inequity costs. In particular, Englmaier and Wambach (2010) point out that an employer may prefer team incentives although they violate the informativeness principle since workers'tasks are unrelated. Paying team bonuses to workers is optimal because they result in less unequal payments.
Weinschenk ( sion is large enough, it will be optimal for the principal not to use an informative signal for creating incentives. Hence, the optimal contract boils down to a constant wage.
To the best of our knowledge, there only exists one paper that also compares individual incentive contracts with a bonus-pool contract, namely Koch and Peyrache (2011). Koch and Peyrache consider a two-period model with binary e¤orts, binary outputs and binary agent types. All players are risk neutral and agents are protected by limited liability. In this setting, it can be optimal for a principal to conceal information on agents'types to outsiders.
For that purpose, the principal designs an opaque organization that makes agents' performance unobservable to the labor market so that an initially objective performance measure becomes subjective. Such policy leads to the following trade-o¤: on the one hand, uncertainty about agents' types creates career-concerns incentives (see Holmstrom 1999) , which is bene…cial for the principal. On the other hand, unveri…ability of individual performance renders individual bonus contracts impossible. However, the principal can rely on the self-commitment property of a bonus pool to create incentives.
Under certain conditions, the principal prefers an opaque organization that leads to a combination of career-concerns incentives and a bonus pool to a transparent organization which allows for the use of individual bonus contracts but eliminates career concerns. In our paper, we study under which conditions a bonus-pool contract dominates individual bonus contracts even in the absence of additional career-concerns incentives.
The Model
We consider a situation where an employer must hire two workers in order to run a …rm. The three players are risk neutral. We assume that worker i (i = 1; 2) chooses non-negative e¤ort e i to increase the employer's pro…ts.
The employer observes the veri…able or objective performance measure
with 1 and 2 as random variables, denoting either noise or luck. The variables 1 and 2 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with density f and cdf F , satisfying lim j j!1 f ( ) = 0. We assume that
1 to guarantee that 1 2 has a continuous density g with corresponding cdf G. Both technical assumptions on f are satis…ed by most commonly used densities. The probability distributions are common knowledge. The employer can neither observe e i nor i so that we have a typical moral-hazard problem.
Exerting e¤ort e i entails costs c (e i ) for worker i with c (0) = c 0 (0) = 0 and c 0 (e i ) ; c 00 (e i ) ; c 000 (e i ) > 0 for e i > 0. 5 Let the workers'reservation values be u = 0. Workers are …nancially constrained so that their wage payments must be non-negative. 6 Each worker maximizes expected net income, consisting of expected wage payment minus e¤ort costs, whereas the employer maximizes e 1 + e 2 minus expected wage payments.
In the following, we will compare two di¤erent contracts that are frequently used in practice. On the one hand, the employer can o¤er an individual bonus contract (b Hi ;b Li ;^ i ) to each worker i (i = 1; 2). Worker i 4 See, e.g., Hermalin (2005) , pp. 155-156, on such a setting with an additively separable performance measure x i (e i ). In the main part of the paper, we follow this state-space formulation; see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) , pp. 77-78, and the cited literature on this approach. In the online appendix, we switch to the parameterized distribution formulation (Hart and Holmstrom 1987, p. 78) and show that our qualitative …nding still holds. 5 The assumption c 000 (e i ) > 0 is often used in moral-hazard models with limited liability to guarantee strict concavity of the employer's objective function; see, e.g., Schmitz (2005) bonus contract, is used to …ne-tune incentives in the bonus-pool contract.
As mentioned before, workers are protected by limited liability, implyinĝ
Recall that we assume noise to be i.i.d.. If 1 and 2 were not independent, then bonus pools would be desirable because they eliminate common noise (Holmstrom 1982, Green and Stokey 1983) . Our story for why bonus pools may be desirable is completely di¤erent. We assume 1 and 2 are independent to focus the model on our main point.
As explained in Section 2, we consider two alternative restrictions. As a …rst alternative, we impose the restriction that the employer can only choose …nite thresholds^ i ; 2 [0; ] with > 0 and that f and g are strictly positive on [0; + "] for some " > 0. In Germany, for example, industry-wide unions negotiate collective agreements with the employers' association concerning general conditions for employment contracts. We can imagine that such collective agreements restrict thresholds by a certain upper bound > 0. As a second alternative, we follow the suggestion of Innes (1990) and assume that the employer is wealth-constrained so that only a …nite capital K > 0 is available to pay the workers.
The timeline is the usual one in moral-hazard models. First, the employer o¤ers the workers either individual bonus contracts (b Hi ;b Li ;^ i ) or a bonus-7 According to this rule, both workers will get the low bonus if a tie occurs, that is,
. A natural extension would be to consider contracts where the workers receive some other …xed payment, e.g.
, in case of a tie. We show in the appendix that these more general contracts would not increase the pro…t of the employer.
pool contract (b H ; b L ; ). Then, the workers can accept or reject the contract o¤er. If the workers accept, they will choose non-negative e¤ort levels. Next, the random variables 1 and 2 are realized. Finally, the employer and the workers receive their payo¤s according to the contract.
An Illustrative Example
In this example, we assume the employer seeks to implement a certain e¤ort level, e 1 = e 2 , and each i is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 .
The analysis in the following sections will show that the employer opti- exerts optimal e¤ort that equates his marginal e¤ort costs and marginal expected wage payments. Thus, the incentive constraint for individual bonus contracts can be written as
Under a bonus-pool contract, again worker i's optimal e¤ort equates marginal e¤ort costs and marginal expected wage payments. However, now wage payments depend on relative performance and, hence, the corresponding density g, which is again normal but has doubled variance (see, e.g., Wolfstetter 1999, p. 306). In a symmetric equilibrium, the two homogeneous workers choose identical e¤orts so that the incentive constraint under the bonus-pool contract reads as
The comparison of the incentive constraints (2) and (3) shows why, in agreement with Holmstrom's informativeness principle, individual bonuses seem to be better suited than a bonus pool to motivate workers. To implement e¤ort level e i at minimum costs, the employer chooses^ i = e i in (2) and = 0 in (3). Hence, the bonus pool boils down to a simple tournament in which the worker with the higher performance receives b H as winner prize.
Inserting^ i = e i and = 0 leads to
with f (0) = 1= p 2 2 and g (0) = 1= p 4 2 and, thus, f (0) > g (0). Intuitively, the relative performance measure x i (e i ) x j (e j ) is less precise than the performance measure x i (e i ) due to the doubled variance so that the density g is ‡atter than f . As a consequence, for the same bonus payment Recall that the employer wants each worker to exert a certain e¤ort level.
Now suppose that the employer is wealth-constrained and possesses limited capital K. Thus, the highest possible e¤ort that can be induced under individual bonuses,ê , is implicitly described by
whereas a bonus pool leads to maximum e¤ort e of each worker being described by c 0 (e ) = K g(0):
, for any …xed K, the maximum e¤ort that can be implemented via individual bonuses is less than that which can be implemented by a bonus pool. As the example illustrates, bonus pools only use one collective payment to incentivize multiple workers which can lead to a crucial advantage under the assumption of a wealth-constrained employer that dominates the disadvantage suggested by Holmstrom's informativeness principle.
The Optimal Bonus-Pool Contract
In the following, the game is solved by backwards induction. First, we consider the workers' e¤ort choices for a given bonus-pool contract (b H ; b L ; ) and then we derive the optimal contract (b H ; b L ; ). We show in the appendix that only contracts with b L = 0 need to be considered and that, for these contracts, in equilibrium the workers choose e¤orts e 1 = e 2 =: e implicitly described by
The participation constraint is satis…ed for every b H 0 since each worker can ensure himself a non-negative expected utility -and, thus, at least his reservation value -by accepting any contract with non-negative payments and choosing zero e¤ort. Equation (4) shows that, in equilibrium, each worker exerts the e¤ort that equates marginal costs and the expected marginal gain from winning the relative performance evaluation.
At the …rst stage of the game, the employer chooses the optimal bonus-
subject to the incentive constraint (4) and the limited-liability constraint
According to (5), the employer faces the following trade-o¤ when choosing the optimal gap : On the one hand, he should choose a very large to reduce the probability of paying out b H (implementation-cost e¤ect). On the other hand, (4) indicates that a very large gap may also reduce incentives (incentive e¤ect). If, for example, the convolution g is a normal density, g ( ) will decrease from the mean to the tail.
Let r := g= [1 G] denote the hazard rate of the di¤erence i j , and (e ; ) the solution to problem (5), i.e., the employer chooses the gap and implements e¤ort e . We obtain the following result: (b) Suppose r is increasing and the employer has limited wealth K > 0.
De…ne e > 0 by c 0 ( e) = Kg(0). Then e maximizes e c 0 (e)=r( (e)) over Problem (5) shows that the employer wants to maximize the value of the hazard rate to trade o¤ the implementation-cost e¤ect against the incentive e¤ect. This observation immediately leads to the results of Proposition 1(a).
The hazard rate r can have various shapes. 10 If it is monotonic, we will obtain a clear-cut result: in case of a monotonically decreasing (increasing) hazard rate the employer forgoes a gap (chooses the maximum possible gap ).
We know that the convolution g has a peak at zero, which is also its global maximum.
11 If the convolution is single-peaked, the hazard rate r = g= [1 G] is monotonically increasing in the negative domain up to the peak at zero since the numerator is increasing and the denominator decreasing. To the right of the peak the hazard rate will be still increasing if the decreasing denominator dominates the decreasing numerator. Proposition 1(a) includes this case, in which the implementation-cost e¤ect dominates the incentive e¤ect. This result holds in particular for the class of log-concave densities 9 All proofs are relegated to the appendix. 10 See, e.g., Glaser (1980) . 11 See Lemma 1 in the proof of Proposition 1(b).
g (e.g., for the normal distribution).
12 For these distributions, the employer prefers = to minimize the probability of paying out the high bonus,
Since g ( ) -and, hence, workers'incentives -become smaller the larger the gap , the employer has to compensate for the incentive e¤ect by choosing an appropriately large bonus b H (see the incentive constraint (4)). Recall from the beginning of this paragraph that = 0 maximizes workers' incentives. In contrast, under a log-concave density the employer minimizes incentives by the optimal gap in order to minimize expected implementation costs as well.
Proposition 1(b) also refers to the case of an increasing hazard rate, but now the employer's limited wealth K restricts the set of feasible (e; )-combinations when solving (5). The largest implementable e¤ort is e. Technically, the condition lim j j!1 f ( ) = 0 together with the incentive constraint (4) makes the employer's limited-liability condition binding at the optimum (see (12) in the appendix):
The solution to the employer's problem now has two steps. First, for implementing a certain e¤ort level e at lowest possible cost, the employer chooses the largest corresponding gap = (e) that satis…es equation (6). Second, among all feasible (e; (e))-combinations the employer chooses the combination that solves (5). Recall from part (a) of Proposition 1 that if the hazard rate is increasing and the gap bounded above, the employer wants to combine a very large gap with a very large bonus b H . Part (b) shows that if the employer is wealth-constrained we will have a similar solution since for given e¤ort e the employer still prefers the highest feasible gap (i.e., a gap that satis…es (6)).
12 See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) , section 6, for further examples.
Comparison with Individual Bonus Contracts
In the following, we will show that (1) although workers' tasks are completely unrelated and (2) although a bonus-pool contract in combination with relative performance evaluation leads to a less precise measure, the optimal bonus-pool contract can nevertheless dominate optimal individual bonus contracts.
The optimal bonus contract for each single worker i, (b H ;b L ;^ ), 13 can be derived in two steps. First, workers'e¤ort choice is analyzed for a given
. Second, the employer anticipates worker behavior and chooses the optimal contract that maximizes his expected net pro…ts. We start with the step where each worker i (i = 1; 2) maximizes his expected utilitŷ
with b :=b H b L denoting the bonus spread, and F as cdf and f as density of the i.i.d. random variables 1 and 2 . As Oyer (2000) we assume that the worker's objective function is well-behaved and that optimal e¤ort choice can be described by the …rst-order condition
In stage 1, the employer optimally designs the individual bonus contract.
In analogy to the optimal bonus-pool contract, the workers'limited-liability constraint implies the participation constraint as u = c (0) = 0, and the employer choosesb L = 0 to minimize his labor costs. Thus, for each worker 13 Workers are homogeneous and do not interact. The employer, therefore, prefers the same optimal e¤ort for each worker and chooses identical contracts. Hence, we suppress the subscript "i" to simplify notation.
the employer solves
Problems (5) and (8) look similar because in each case the employer wants to maximize a hazard rate: for the bonus-pool contract the hazard rate r = g=(1 G) of 1 2 , and for the individual bonus contract the hazard rate r = f =(1 F ) of i . For an intuitive explanation of why the employer seeks to maximize the hazard rate consider worker i evaluating e¤ort level e i under an individual bonus contract (b H ;b L ;^ ). To obtain the high bonus, the worker must have some amount of luck: i ^ e i . Assuming he has the required amount of luck, the worker is interested in the conditional probability that his performance will exceed the threshold signi…cantly, say,
x i (e i ) >^ + with some small > 0. The probability is related to the hazard rate by P (x i (e i ) >^ + j i ^ e i ) 1 r (^ e i ). The larger this probability, the weaker the incentive for the worker to increase his e¤ort.
This e¤ect explains why a large value of r (^ e i ) is in the interest of the employer. A similar argument applies in the case of a bonus-pool contract.
A comparison of individual bonus contracts and bonus-pool contracts leads, in view of (5) and (8), to a comparison of the hazard rates r and r.
If the thresholds of both contract types are equally constrained (i.e., ;^ 2 [0; ]), the optimal bonus-pool contract will dominate individual contracts if r( ) r ( ) for all , that is, if 1 2 is smaller than 1 in the hazard rate order, see e.g. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) . A su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is that the i are non-negative and have an increasing hazard rate.
Proposition 2 Suppose the density f is log-concave or, more generally, the hazard rate r of i is increasing.
(a) Suppose 1 and 2 are non-negative and the thresholds are bounded above (i.e., ;^ 2 [0; ]). Then the optimal bonus-pool contract will dominate all individual bonus contracts. If r is strictly increasing, using the optimal bonus pool instead of two bonus contracts will lead to a strict improvement.
(b) Suppose the employer has limited wealth K > 0. Suppose further that the hazard rate r of 1 2 is increasing as well and that e¤ort e > 0 is implementable by either contract. Let
and^ ( e) := max ^ 0 :
Then the bonus-pool contract implementing e at minimal costs sets ( e), the individual bonus contract implementing e at minimal costs sets^ ( e), and the bonus pool is less costly if and only if r ( ( e)) > r (^ ( e) e).
Proposition 2(a) deals with the scenario considered by Kim (1997 ), Oyer (2000 , Poblete and Spulber (2012) and others who assume that the i can only take non-negative values. The authors motivate their setting by assuming that the performance measure x i describes physical output or realized sales so that the exclusion of negative realizations seems reasonable. Part (a) points out that for a wide class of probability distributions, including truncated normal and uniform distributions, the optimal bonus contract can be strictly improved by combining workers'incentives via a bonus-pool contract.
Whereas this result holds for exogenously constrained thresholds, Proposition 2(b) refers to endogenous thresholds and does not restrict the possible realizations of the i . According to (b), a …nding similar to part (a) will hold for thresholds that are endogenously constrained by the employer's limited wealth if the optimal thresholds for the two contract types do not di¤er too much. Then, the hazard-rate-order result of part (a) (i.e., r ( ) > r ( ) for all 0, see the proof in the appendix) is still decisive for the comparison between the bonus pool and individual bonus contracts and the employer can implement a certain e¤ort level at lower expected costs by using a bonus pool instead of two individual bonus contracts.
Against the background of Holmstrom's informativeness principle, 14 the 14 See Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) for the multi-agent case.
results of Proposition 2 seem surprising as the workers'tasks are neither technically nor stochastically related. A bonus-pool contract uses relative performance evaluation, and the relative performance measure x 1 (e 1 ) x 2 (e 2 ) is less precise than the measure x i (e i ) used by an individual bonus contract.
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Correspondingly, it is plausible that the implementation of a given e¤ort level requires a bonus pool, b H , that is larger than the total bonus, 2b H , o¤ered under two individual contracts.
However, for implementing a certain e¤ort level e, it is not the size of the bonus, but the expected costs, that the employer is primarily interested in. The probability that the bonus pool is paid out is 2[1 G( )] and the probability that the individual bonus is paid out is 1 F (^ e). The expected costs under the bonus-pool contract and under the individual contracts are
As argued above, given e¤ort e, the corresponding bonus pool b H should be larger than total bonus 2b H . However, the implementation-cost e¤ect mentioned in Section 5, which focuses on the probability of paying out b H or 2b H , respectively, works into the opposite direction. Especially, if the i are non-negative, 1 G( ) < 1 F ( ) 1 F ( e). Hence, the probability of paying out the bonus pool tends to be smaller than the probability of paying the high bonuses to both workers under individual contracts. Proposition 2 provides conditions under which the implementation-cost e¤ect is strong enough to dominate the incentive downside so that the employer prefers a bonus pool to individual bonuses. 16 Since workers are protected by limited liability and earn positive rents, a dominance of the bonus-pool contract over individual bonus contracts implies that the employer bene…ts from reduced worker rents when pooling incentives.
Less technically, the advantage of a bonus pool in connection with relative performance evaluation can be explained as follows. The previous results 15 V ar ( 1 2 ) = 2V ar ( i ), so that the relative performance measure is half as precise as the absolute performance measure for a single worker, x i (e i ). 16 An example in the online appendix illustrates the previous arguments and the magnitude by which the bonus-pool contract may outperform the bonus contract.
have shown that, due to the increasing hazard rate, the employer wants to combine a large threshold with large bonus payments under both individual bonuses and a bonus pool. The latter one has two advantages in this situation. First, if the quota for individual bonuses is exogenously constrained tô = , the employer will strictly bene…t from using as minimum distance and letting the workers compete against each other via relative performance evaluation. Competition implies that each worker now has to beat and his opponent which leads to an extension of the original threshold and, thereby, a reduction of worker rents via the implementation-cost e¤ect. Second, under a bonus pool several workers compete for only one large bonus payment, whereas under individual bonuses each worker has to be incentivized by a separate wage premium. If the employer is wealth-constrained, one big bonus pool may work better than several individual bonuses, which are rather small since the employer is …nancially constrained.
Proposition 2 does not address the possibility that the employer may be unable to implement certain e¤ort levels under one of the contracts. However, if the employer is wealth-constrained, the implementable e¤orts will be bounded. The following result compares the sets of implementable e¤orts under the two types of contracts. We assume that the noise variables i have a non-negative mode, so that not only non-negative i are covered but also i with a density that is symmetric about a non-negative point. We do not impose any restrictions on the hazard rates. 
then every e¤ort that can be implemented by individual bonus contracts can also be implemented by a bonus-pool contract and there is a non-degenerate interval of e¤orts that can be implemented via a bonus pool but not via individual bonuses.
Proposition 3 explains the main observations in the example of Section 4 and shows, in a much more general setting, how the employer's limited wealth favors the implementability of e¤ort by a bonus pool compared to individual bonuses. There exist critical levels, e 1 , e 2 , such that every e¤ort e e 1 is implementable by either type of contract, e¤orts e > e 2 cannot be implemented by any bonus contract, and if (9) holds, then all the e¤orts e 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ] can be implemented by a bonus pool, but not by individual bonuses. Moreover, the capital K required to implement a desired e¤ort is smaller when bonus pools are used than when individual bonuses are used.
Condition (9) The intuition for our …ndings is the following. The incentive constraints (4) and (7) show that, under either contract, the product of the bonus payment in case of success (i.e., b H andb H , respectively) and the marginal winning probability (i.e., g ( ) and f (^ e), respectively) has to be su¢ ciently large for the implementation of a certain e¤ort level. In view of the employer's limited-liability constraint, the bonus payment is restricted by K for a bonus pool and by K=2 for each individual bonus. Since the amount of liability per worker is twice as high under a bonus pool than under individual bonuses, the employer may implement certain e¤orts solely via the bonus pool if this liability advantage is not outweighed by a su¢ ciently larger marginal winning probability.
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To sum up, the results of Section 6 have shown that complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling incentives may not only save rents for the employer but also increase the set of implementable e¤ort 17 Under the convolution, the probability mass is more spread out, and max g( ) =
levels.
Discussion
We have shown under which conditions a …rm that employs two workers prefers a bonus pool to individual bonus contracts. This dominance of a bonus-pool contract will still hold if we extend our setting to the case of more than two workers. In that case, the employer can divide the set of workers into pairs of two workers whose incentives are combined by a bonuspool contract. If the number of workers, say n, is even, there will be n=2 bonus pools; if n is odd, the employer can design (n 1) =2 bonus pools and one individual bonus contract. If pooling of more than two workers does not lead to worker discouragement when competing for the bonus payments, the outcome of optimal bonus-pool contracts can be even further improved.
In the paper, we often refer to the case of an increasing hazard rate. This assumption holds for many well-known distributions like the normal distribution and the uniform distribution. Less clear-cut results can be derived for non-monotonic hazard rates. However, not all …ndings are based on an increasing hazard rate. In particular, Proposition 3 on the implementability of given e¤ort levels does not impose any restriction on the shape of the hazard rate.
Condition (9) shows that a bonus pool can be less e¤ective if the convolution g becomes very ‡at compared to the initial density f . In that case, incentives are rather small under a bonus pool for given bonus payments.
Hence, the bonus pool will only dominate individual bonus contracts if the comparative advantage of …nancing incentives for all workers together via K exceeds the disadvantage of a small g (0).
Throughout the paper we assumed that the performance measures x i (e i ) are veri…able. Skipping this assumption without adding supplementary assumptions like repeated interaction or third-party contracting would render the use of individual bonuses impossible. Bonus-pool contracts that pay out the same amount under all possible outcomes still work due to their selfcommitment property, which has been highlighted by Malcomson (1984) .
Finally, one can ask whether our results are robust to the formulation of the moral-hazard problem used in this paper. As a robustness check, we can switch from the state-space formulation to the parameterized distribution formulation, where e¤ort choice shifts probability mass over possible outcomes (e.g., Hart and Holmstrom 1987, p. 78) . 18 We can show that the advantage of pooling bonus payments in situations with a …nancially constrained employer also holds under this alternative modeling of our moral-hazard problem.
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Bonus contracts have the bene…cial characteristic that the performance target or threshold can be used by the employer as an e¤ective instrument to …ne-tune incentives. Since the threshold does not only in ‡uence workers'
incentives but also the probability that a bonus payment occurs -and, hence, the magnitude of worker rents -the employer has to trade o¤ both e¤ects when choosing the optimal threshold. In case of a bonus-pool contract, the employer faces a similar optimization problem. The central result of this paper has shown that -for a wide class of probability distributions -a bonus pool o¤ers a better solution to the trade o¤ than individual bonus contracts. 18 We thank a referee for pointing to this alternative. 19 See the online appendix for details.
Workers'equilibrium e¤orts:
We …rst consider bonus-pool contracts with relative-performance evaluation that are more general than those in the main part of the text and we derive the induced equilibrium e¤orts. The greater generality allows us to justify our treatment of ties. We also show why the employer should pay nothing to a worker that has been weakly outperformed by his co-worker. Because of our assumption that performance measures are veri…able, contracts need not satisfy Malcomson's (1984) self-commitment property. That is, the employer does not have to pay out the same amount under all possible outcomes.
Suppose worker i receives payment w (x i x j ) with w : R ! [0; 1) being non-decreasing and x k x k (e k ) (k = i; j) according to (1). Under this payment scheme, worker 1 maximizes his expected net income
where g denotes the density of 1 2 . Using integration by substitution we obtain
Similarly, worker 2's objective function reads as
We assume that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is characterized by the …rst-order conditions
and
Since workers are homogeneous, we concentrate on the characterization of symmetric equilibria, 21 leading to e 1 = e 2 . Inserting the symmetry condition e 1 = e 2 =: e into the …rst-order conditions yields
Suppose under w it is possible that agent i receives a positive payment even if x i < x j . Then the employer can save labor costs by switching to the alternative scheme
which is non-negative, non-decreasing and, moreover, satis…es w (v) w (v)
for all v. Integration by substitution and the symmetry of g yield
20 Pure-strategy equilibria will exist if the cost function is su¢ ciently steep and the density g su¢ ciently ‡at so that the workers'objective functions are concave in the relevant range. Existence can be proved for given speci…cations of the noise distribution. See also Lazear and Rosen (1981 ), p. 845, Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983 ), p. 29, Wolfstetter (1999 ), p. 305, Schöttner (2008 and Gürtler (2011) . 21 Symmetric equilibria seem to be most plausible since workers are completely homogeneous. The symmetric equilibrium is unique. However, in our general setting we cannot exclude the existence of additional asymmetric equilibria.
Hence, by (10), w and w induce the same e¤ort level. If w(v 0 ) > 0 for
Thus, w leads to strictly smaller costs for the employer.
Now let w describe a bonus-pool contract with a gap > 0 where worker
By what has just been shown, every contract of this form with b L > 0 or > 0 can be strictly improved by a contract of the same form with b L = = 0.
For this reason we have disregarded bonus-pool contracts with 6 = b L and in the derivation of the optimal contract in Section 5 we could further assume that b L = 0. The e¤ort level e induced by contract (b H ; 0; ) is, according to (10), given by
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) Objective function (5) shows that the employer prefers the gap that maximizes r ( ) in order to minimize expected implementation costs for a certain e¤ort level e. Then for given , the employer implements optimal e¤ort e that solves (5) by …ne-tuning incentives via b H according to (4). If r is monotonically increasing, then = is optimal. An (1998) and Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that log-concavity of a density function implies that this density has an increasing hazard rate, leading to = .
(b) The proof uses the following auxiliary result:
Lemma 1 The global maximum of the convolution g is attained at zero.
Proof Recall that 1 and 2 are i.i.d. with density f . In view of the as-
2 has a continuous density g and 
If the employer has limited wealth K he will face the additional constraint b H K, which, by (4), is equivalent to
Since c 0 is strictly increasing, there exists 0 satisfying (12) if and only if e 2 [0; e] where e, de…ned by c 0 ( e) = Kg(0), is the maximum implementable e¤ort level according to Lemma 1. Since r( ) is increasing and the employer has to solve (5), for any e¤ort level e 2 (0; e] that he wants to implement he chooses, if possible, the largest corresponding that satis…es (12). The condition lim j j!1 f ( ) = 0 implies that lim !1 g ( ) = 0 and, hence, that the right-hand side of (12) goes to zero as ! 1. It follows that for every e 2 (0; e], there exists a largest satisfying (12), and for this , (12) must be binding, so that coincides with (e) as de…ned in Proposition 1(b). In view of (5), the optimal e¤ort e maximizes e c 0 (e)=r( (e)).
Proof of Proposition 2:
According to An (1998) and Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) , r will be monotonically increasing if f is log-concave. 22 The step from line 1 to line 2 uses the fact that
(a) We show strict improvement for the case of a strictly increasing hazard rate r ; proving weak dominance for an increasing hazard rate proceeds analogously. According to (5) and (8), any e¤ort level e 2 (0; ] can be implemented at a lower cost under a bonus-pool contract compared to an individual bonus contract if
Let := supfx 2 R : F (x) < 1g. Using the convolution formula g ( ) = , Mood et al. 1974, p. 185) we obtain for all 2
where the inequality follows from the strict monotonicity of r . Thus, combining e¤ort e with the gap = e under a bonus pool leads to strictly lower implementation costs compared to individual bonus contracts. (7) yields that c 0 ( e) f (^ e) K=2 must hold for implementing e under individual bonus contracts. Since r is increasing and lim j j!1 f ( ) = 0, objective function (8) shows that the optimal quota for implementing e at lowest cost is given by^ ( e) as de…ned in Proposition 2(b). In view of (5) and (8), the bonus pool has lower implementation costs if and only if r( ( e)) > r (^ ( e) e).
23 (5) describes the employer's maximization problem for both workers. 24 See Miravete (2005) , p. 1358, on a similar proof for the sum of two random variables,
Proof of Proposition 3:
It was shown in the proof of Proposition 2(b) that e¤ort e can be implemented by individual bonus contracts if and only if c 0 (e) K max^ 0 f (^ e)=2. Since f has a non-negative mode, this inequality is equivalent to
That e¤ort e can be implemented by a bonus-pool contract if and only if c 0 (e) Kg (0) was shown in the proof of Proposition 1(b).
Online Appendix Parameterized Distribution Formulation
We consider a scenario in which the employer has only limited capital K and show that a bonus-pool contract can again strictly outperform individual bonus contracts.
Let the two workers choose binary e¤orts e 2 fe L ; e H g with e L < e H . The corresponding e¤ort costs are c (e L ) = 0 < c := c (e H ). We assume that it always pays for the employer to implement e H instead of e L . 25 The veri…able performance measure x i follows a probability distribution that depends on the worker's e¤ort choice. Let P (x j je k ) = P jk with j = 1; : : : ; m and k = L; H denote the probability that the performance measure of a worker leads to realization x j given that the worker chose e¤ort e k . We assume that x 1 < x 2 < < x m and P jH < P jL for all j 6 = m; and P mH > P mL so that the distribution P (x j je H ) dominates the distribution P (x j je L ) within the meaning of …rst-order stochastic dominance. 26 As before, we assume that workers are protected by limited liability (i.e., negative wages are not feasible) and that each worker has a zero reservation value so that we can ignore the workers'participation constraint in the following. To sum up, in the given setting the employer wants to choose the incentive scheme that implements e H at minimal costs.
We start with the analysis of the optimal individual bonus contracts.
Since both workers are identical, we can focus on the decision problem of one of them. Letb j 0 denote the bonus payment to a worker if his performance measure takes the value x j (j = 1; : : : ; m). The incentive constraint for implementing e H reads as
25 This simplifying assumption is often made to get rid of further cases that do not really add to the analysis. 26 Skipping the assumption P jH < P jL ; 8j 6 = m; would only strengthen our results. 27 As usual we assume that the worker chooses the higher e¤ort level when being indifferent between e H and e L .
Hence, the optimal individual bonus contract (b 1 ; : : : ;b m ) that implements e H at lowest costs is described bŷ b j = 0 for all j 6 = m; andb m = c P mH P mL :
The maximal payment to both workers, 2b m , is not allowed to exceed the employer's capital, K, so that the optimal individual bonus contract will only be feasible if the employer's limited-liability condition
is satis…ed.
If the employer is allowed to pool the bonus payments for the two workers, individual payments can be made contingent on the realizations of both workers'performance measures. Again, we can focus on the situation of one of the workers. Let b ij denote the bonus payment to a worker if his performance measure has the realization x i and that of his co-worker the realization x j , i; j 2 f1; : : : ; mg. The incentive constraint for implementing e H for each worker -i.e., the Nash equilibrium condition that the worker does not want to deviate from e H given that his co-worker chooses e H -is given by
Thus, a bonus-pool contract given by (b ij ) leads to high e¤ort by each worker at minimal expected costs if and only if b ij = 0 for all i < m and all j, and
A wealth-constrained employer must be able to pay the bonuses b mj to the workers under any pair of realizations x i and x j . Even in the worst case the employer must have enough capital to pay the respective bonuses. Hence, to minimize the maximal possible cost, it is optimal to choose b mj such that total labor costs are identical for any pair (x i ; x j ). The bonus b mm has to be paid twice if both workers'performance measures take the highest realization x m , whereas in all other situations we have at most one positive bonus payment.
It is, therefore, optimal for the employer to choose, for some b , b mj = b for all j 6 = m, and b mm = 1 2 b at the left-hand side of equation (14), leading to
This optimal bonus pool will only be feasible under a wealth-constrained employer if
The comparison of (13) and (15) shows that 1
is true. Hence, there exist values of the employer's capital K for which the optimal bonus-pool contract is feasible and implements e H whereas the optimal individual bonus contract is not feasible, but the opposite case that the individual bonus contract is feasible and the bonus-pool contract is infeasible can never happen. 28 
An Illustrating Example on the Dominance of Bonus Pools
To illustrate the arguments of Proposition 2 and the magnitude by which the bonus-pool contract may outperform the bonus contract, we consider a speci…c distribution with strictly increasing hazard rate. We concentrate on the case of^ ; 2 [0; ] to condense our arguments. Suppose that the i (i = 1; 2) are uniformly distributed over [0; 1], so that f ( ) = 1 and F ( ) = , and let 2 [0; 1). Furthermore, we assume that c (e i ) = e 3 i =3 ( > 0) with being su¢ ciently large to guarantee interior solutions.
For the optimal bonus contract (b H ; 0;^ ), the employer maximizes (1 ) 9 2 + (1 )
which is strictly positive.
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In order to compute the optimal bonus-pool contract (b H ; 0; ),
we …rst have to construct the density g. The composed random variable := 1 2 can be either negative with 1 0 or positive with 0 < 1.
Furthermore, recall that 0 
since f ( 1 ) = 1; 8 1 . The cdf G is obtained by integrating g and using the fact that G ( 1) = 0 and G (1) = 1:
29 > 1=[ (2 + )] guarantees that e 2 (0; 1). leading to expected pro…t
(At the second stage, given = and b H = 1= (1 )
3
, worker i's reaction curve, e i (e j ), is implicitly described by
) if e i e j + ; In the upper case, e i (e j ) and e i = e j + intersect atẽ j = 1 q 1 (1 ) 3 . In the lower case, an intersection between e i (e j ) and e i = e j + will exist if and only if s 1 (1 )
In addition, we need
Combining both conditions yields 1 2 (1 )
which requires that > 1=[2 (1
Condition (18) is satis…ed for e j = e if is su¢ ciently large. Thus, we assume to be su¢ ciently large so that an intersection is guaranteed. Solving e i (e j ) = e j + (described by (16) To sum up, the reaction curve e i (e j ) starts with a positive slope at e j = 0 (see the upper case). It intersects with e i = e j + at e j =ẽ j and then proceeds with a negative slope (see the lower case). 30 The reaction curve ends where condition (17) holds with equality (i.e., at e j = 1 4(1 ) 3 2 + 1 ). Mirroring e i (e j ) against the 45-degree line gives worker j's reaction curve, e j (e i ). Both reaction curves intersect in the symmetric equilibrium with e i = e j = e .)
Comparing the solution under the optimal individual bonus contracts with the solution under the optimal bonus-pool contract leads to the following results:
Example Suppose noise is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and workers have cubic costs c (e) = e 3 =3. Then r ( ) = 2 r ( ), 8 > 0, and we obtain b H > 4b H and e > 2e . Moreover, > . The probability that botĥ b H are paid out under the optimal bonus contract, (1 F ( e )) 2 , is larger than the probability that b H is paid out under the optimal bonus-pool contract,
(1 G ( )).
Proof Using the expressions for the optimal e¤ort levels, we have e 2e = 3 + 2 (1 )
showing that e > 2e . Hence, by (7) and (4),
30 The shape of the workers'reaction curves is typical of contest or relative-compensation games. First, it re ‡ects strategic complements and then switches to strategic substitutes.
See, e.g., Wärneryd [Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 33 (2000) The two expressions show that under a bonus-pool contract the employer can always implement the same e¤ort level at lower cost compared to the bonus contract. As e > 2e points out, the employer is even better o¤ by implementing much more e¤ort under a bonus-pool contract.
We have (1 )
The example shows that the major idea of creating incentives via a bonus contract and a bonus-pool contract is very similar. In both cases, the employer chooses a large threshold to minimize expected implementation costs.
In order to restore worker motivation, the employer has to combine this quota with a su¢ ciently high bonus payment. Under the optimal bonus-pool contract, incentive pay is considerably higher than under individual bonus contracts (i.e., b H > 4b H ). Since the production technology is the same under either contract but expected implementation costs are lower under the bonus pool due to r ( ) = 2 r ( ), 8 > 0, the optimal bonus pool yields implemented e¤ort that is more than twice as high as that under the optimal bonus contract (e > 2e ).
When choosing the optimal threshold for the bonus pool, the employer faces the following trade-o¤: A large threshold minimizes (i) the probability of paying out the bonus pool (implementation-cost e¤ect) but also (ii) the workers' incentives, since g ( ) decreases in > 0 (incentive e¤ect).
However, this trade-o¤ is absent under a bonus contract in this example since f is a constant so that a large quota does not in ‡uence workers' incentives. Consequently, the employer chooses the maximum possible quota under the optimal bonus contract. He chooses the same threshold under the optimal bonus-pool contract because the implementation-cost e¤ect strictly dominates the incentive e¤ect. Despite the trade-o¤, the optimal bonus-pool contract outperforms the optimal bonus contract, which is indicated by the large implemented e¤ort and the relatively low probability of paying out the bonus pool (i.e., (1 F ( e )) 2 > 2 (1 G ( ))). and, hence, the bonus-pool contract still outperforms the bonus contract by about 39 percent. These examples point out that switching from the optimal bonus contract to the optimal bonus-pool contract can increase an employer's expected pro…ts considerably.
32 31 We have disregarded the fact that, under the optimal bonus contract, the employer has to pay out one of the two bonuses with probability 2F ( e ) [1 F ( e )], which even strengthens our argument. 32 For the case of an increasing hazard rate, Poblete and Spulber (2012) , Proposition 2, suggest compensating each worker according to maxfx i (e i ) r; 0g for some r 0. We can show for our example that the optimal bonus-pool contract also leads to higher pro…ts compared to this contract.
